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A Defense of the Constitutionality of the
Individual Mandate
by Erwin Chemerinsky
Under current constitutional law, I do not think this is a close
question. It is quite clear that this law is constitutional because it
exercises Congress's power. Lest this be taken as the observation of a
liberal law professor, Charles Fried-whom no one would call a liberal
law professor, former Solicitor General in the Bush Administration-said
on Fox television that he had recently been to Australia and purchased
a kangaroo hat, and he would eat that hat if the Supreme Court were to
declare this law unconstitutional. While I do not find a hat made out of
kangaroo skins to be politically correct, and I would be amused to watch
Professor Fried eat the hat, I think he is going to be spared this
indigestion. He is absolutely right that it is hardly a colorable claim
that this law is unconstitutional.
Since 1937, the Supreme Court has struck down no major social
program. In fact, you have to go back to when the Supreme Court was
invalidating New Deal legislation. I do not think the Supreme Court is
going to start here by striking down the health care legislation. In fact,
to strike down the health care legislation would require the Supreme
Court to pull the threads of many different aspects of post-1937
constitutional law. The temptation might be to say, "Well, there are five
conservative Justices; maybe they are not willing to depart from much
of post-1937 constitutional law." But remember, so much of the
conservative rhetoric over the last several decades has been against
judicial activism. It would be an enormous act of judicial activism to
strike down this legislation.
I think the real objection to the individual mandate has nothing to do
with the scope of Congress's power. It is really an objection to forcing
people to buy insurance if they do not want to buy insurance. There is
an unarticulated sense that individuals should have a liberty interest to
not have health insurance if they do not want to. But not even the
strongest opponents of the legislation make that argument, because in
post-1937 constitutional law, that is not a colorable argument. The
Supreme Court has made it clear in terms of due process that the
government can regulate the economy so long as it has a rational basis
for doing so. Certainly, Congress has a legitimate interest in making
sure that everybody in the country has health care, and it is reasonable
to require that everybody either purchase it or pay something to cover
the costs.
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The reality is everyone is going to need health care at some point in
their life. If somebody has a communicable disease, the government can
require that it be treated. If somebody is in an automobile accident,
they will be taken to the local emergency room and provided treatment.
So, requiring that everybody have health insurance is certainly
reasonable to meet post-1937 due process requirements.
That, then, is not the basis for the challenge. As Professor Barnett
says, the focus of the lawsuits has been on whether or not the individual
mandate fits within the scope of Congress's authority. Like Professor
Barnett, I want to talk about the Commerce Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause, but I will come to a very different conclusion.
In terms of the Commerce Clause, I think the one thing that Professor
Barnett and I can agree to is the test that the Supreme Court has
followed since United States v. Lopez12 in 1995, and it is one familiar to
all of us. The Supreme Court there said that Congress can act under the
Commerce Clause in three circumstances. First, Congress can regulate
the channels of interstate commerce; second, Congress can regulate the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things in
interstate commerce; and, third, Congress can regulate activities with a
substantial effect on interstate commerce." The Court clarified that
Congress can regulate economic activities which, taken cumulatively,
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
I want to focus initially, as Professor Barnett does, on the third prong
of the test. The one thing that Professor Barnett omits, and which was
also omitted by the federal district court in Virginia that struck down
the plan, is that the Supreme Court has said that Congress can act
under the Commerce Clause so long as it has a rational basis for
believing that one of these three requirements is met. So, as to the third
prong of the test, in Gonzalez v. Raich" the Supreme Court specifically
said Congress may act so long as it has a rational basis for believing
that it is regulating economic activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce." This tremendously lessens the burden on the
government because the rational basis test is so deferential. And I find
it striking that when the federal district court in Virginia v. Sebelius 6
granted summary judgment to the challenges, it did not mention this
aspect of Gonzalez v. Raich. This language of Congress only needing a
rational basis is not new to Gonzalez v. Raich. It goes back to cases like

72. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
73. Id. at 558-59.
74. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
75. Id. at 2-3.
76. 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (2010).
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Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States" and Katzenbach v.
McClung."
So, the question is whether Congress has a rational basis for believing
that an individual mandate is economic activity that has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce? Is it economic activity? Professor
Barnett, like the federal district court in Virginia, implicitly assumes
that economic activity requires that there be an economic transaction.
The implicit argument is that Congress can regulate only economic
transaction activity, but that is just not so. Take Gonzalez v. Raich.
There, the Supreme Court said growing a product that is part of a larger
crop that is bought and sold in interstate commerce is economic
activity." Gonzalez v. Raich changed the law because it broadened what
counts as economic activity. Economic activity includes Angel Raich
growing marijuana for her own home consumption and use.
In fact, lower courts have consistently recognized, even since Lopez,
that economic activity does not require an economic transaction. Take as
an illustration the Federal Drug Free School Zone Acts that makes it a
federal crime to have illegal drugs within 1000 feet of a school. Every
federal district court found that this was constitutional, even after Lopez.
Possessing drugs is economic activity because there is a relationship of
drugs to the overall economy. As another example, the federal law
prohibiting carjacking was adopted by Congress under its Commerce
Clause authority. By definition, there is no economic activity in the
sense of a commercial transaction, but every lower court that has
considered the federal carjacking lawa' has held it to be constitutional.
From this broad perspective of what counts as economic activity, the
individual mandate clearly fits within the definition. Whether a person
purchases or does not purchase health care is economic activity. The act
of purchasing health care is, by definition, economic activity. Congress,
here, is compelling economic activity. Even the choice to not purchase
health care is economic activity because if a person makes a choice not
to purchase health care, the person is making the economic decision to
purchase something else or save the money-it is still economic activity.
Put simply, if Angel Raich growing marijuana for her own home
consumption is economic activity, then certainly the choice whether to
engage in an economic transaction to buy or not buy health care is
economic activity as well.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

379 U.S. 241 (1964).
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25.
21 U.S.C. § 860 (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006).
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The other part of the test is that the activity has to have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. The health care industry is about $800
billion in the United States economy, and that says that what Congress
is doing here clearly does have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. So, just as Angel Raich growing marijuana for her own
consumption or Filburn growing wheat for his family to eat is economic
activity that Congress can regulate, so is this.
Now, what Professor Barnett kept saying in his presentation and what
was featured in the briefs of those challenges is that this law is
unprecedented, that Congress for the first time is compelling economic
activity. That is simply wrong. Consider, for example, the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Title II requires that hotels and restaurants not discriminate based on race. In other words, hotels and restaurants that do not
want to accommodate or serve African customers, who want to refrain
from economic transactions, are compelled to engage in an economic
transaction. That law is compelling economic behavior, and, as you
know, the Supreme Court in HeartofAtlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States
and Katzenbach v. McClung upheld it as constitutional, and in every
subsequent Commerce Clause case, the Court has sided with those
decisions approvingly.
There are other instances where Congress has compelled economic
activity A case that I think is somewhat relevant here but that has not
been cited is Johanns v. Livestock MarketingAss'n." Congress required
that every cow producer pay a $1.00 fee for every head of cattle into a
fund to be used for commercial advertising to encourage beef consumption. Congress was forcing an economic transaction-paying in the
money for the purpose of other economic transactions, commercial
advertising. The Supreme Court upheld the law as constitutional. Think
of the federal pollution control laws," all of which were adopted by
Congress under the Commerce Clause authority. Every time a business
or industry is required to put pollution control devices in, they are forced
to purchase the devices and engage in economic activity. So, it is just
wrong to say that Congress never compels economic activity.
Professor Barnett invokes Lopez and Morrison, but this is far different
from those cases. Lopez was about a gun near a school; Morrison was
about a sexual assault. Those are far more removed from the American
economy than an almost trillion-dollar industry, the health care
industry. Here, as I said, there is an economic transaction going on,
albeit one that is being forced by Congress.

82. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
83. 42 U.S.C. H§ 7401-7671 (2006).
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I want to address, as Professor Barnett did, a second argument, the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Professor Barnett quite correctly says
that the Supreme Court has held since the 1940s that the insurance
industry is interstate commerce. If that is so, then Congress can
regulate the insurance industry to make sure that everyone in the
country has health insurance. By definition, I think it would be found
to be a legitimate government interest; maybe even a compelling
government interest under strict scrutiny. If Congress can do that, then
the Necessary and Proper Clause lets Congress take any steps that are
reasonably related to carry out that objective.
As recently as June 2010 in United States v. Comstock,' the Supreme
Court strongly reaffirmed the scope of Congress's authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The Supreme Court once more said
Congress can take any actions that are reasonably necessary to carry out
its authority. Congress can reasonably believe that requiring that every
person have health insurance is reasonably necessary in order to achieve
its goal of making sure that everybody has health insurance. Congress
made elaborate findings that, unless everybody has health insurance or
pays a fee, the system will not work. So, I think the Necessary and
Proper Clause provides a separate independent basis to find that this is
within the scope of Congress's authority. What is striking about this
argument is it focuses more on the second prong of the Lopez test than
the third because the second prong of the test says Congress may
regulate activities in interstate commerce. The insurance industry is
interstate commerce, and Congress can regulate it under the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
There is yet another argument apart from the Commerce Clause, and
that is Congress's authority for taxing and spending. Congress has
required that everybody purchase health insurance or pay a monthly fee
that is going to be collected by the IRS. I think there is a very strong
argument that this is a tax rather than a penalty, and as a tax, it
becomes permissible. Remember, since 1937 the Supreme Court has
struck down no federal tax spending program as exceeding the scope of
Congress's authority.
As I said, I think in order for the Supreme Court to find this law
unconstitutional, it would have to unravel so much of post-1937
constitutional law, and there is no indication whatsoever that the
Supreme Court is ready or willing or likely to do this.
(continued on next page)
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130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).

